It would seem that Geach's claim is that the relation expressed by 'is identical with' is like the relation expressed by 'is better than', at least in one respect. If x and y are people, it may turn out that x is a better golfer than y, while y is a better poet than x. If we merely say that x is better than y, we fail to specify the respect in which we hold x to be the better. Another (...) way to put this is to say that we have not made clear "in relation to what" x is the better. We can call the relation expressed by 'is better than' a "relative relation," since an ordered pair of things may stand in that relation relative to one thing but not relative to another thing. Geach seems to think that identity is a relative relation. (shrink)

There are things we routinely say that may strike us as literally false but that we are nonetheless reluctant to give up. This might be something mundane, like the way we talk about the sun setting in the west, or it could be something much deeper, like engaging in talk that is ostensibly about numbers despite believing that numbers do not literally exist. Rather than regard such behaviour as self-defeating, a "fictionalist" is someone who thinks that this kind of discourse (...) is entirely appropriate, even helpful, so long as we treat what is said as a useful fiction, rather than as the sober truth. "Fictionalism" can be broadly understood as a view that uses a notion of pretense or fiction in order to resolve certain puzzles or problems that otherwise do not necessarily have anything to do with literature or fictional creations. Within contemporary analytic philosophy, fictionalism has been on the scene for well over a decade and has matured during that time, growing in popularity. There are now myriad competing views about fictionalism and consequently the discussion has branched out into many more subdisciplines of philosophy. Yet there is widespread disagreement on what philosophical fictionalism actually amounts to and about how precisely it ought to be pursued. This volume aims to guide these discussions, collecting some of the most up-to-date work on fictionalism and tracing the view's development over the past decade. After a detailed discussion in the book's introductory chapter of how philosophers should think of fictionalism and its connection to metaontology more generally, the remaining chapters provide readers with arguments for and against this view from leading scholars in the fields of epistemology, ethics, metaphysics, philosophy of science, philosophy of language, and others. (shrink)

Introduction: The use of human samples in genomic research has increased ethical debate about informed consent (IC) requirements and the information that subjects should receive regarding the results of the research. However, there are no quantitative data regarding researchers’ attitudes about these issues. Methods: We present the results of a survey of 104 US and 100 Spanish researchers who had published genomic epidemiology studies in 61 journals during 2006. Results: Researchers preferred a broader IC than the IC they had actually (...) obtained in their published papers. US authors were more likely than their Spanish colleagues to support obtaining a broad IC, covering either any future research project or any projects related to a group of diseases (67.6% vs 43%; adjusted OR = 4.84, 95% CI, 2.32 to 10.12). A slight majority of researchers (55.8%) supported informing participants about individual genomic results only if the reliability and clinical validity of the information had been established. Men were more likely than women to believe that patients should be informed of research results even if these conditions were not met (adjusted OR = 2.89, 95% CI = 1.46 to 5.72). Conclusions: This study provides evidence of a wide range of views among scientists regarding some controversial ethical issues related to genomic research, suggesting the need for more study, debate and education. In the interim, journals might consider including the investigators’ policies regarding these ethical issues in the papers they publish in the field of genomic epidemiology. (shrink)

This collection of recent articles by leading scholars is designed to illuminate one of the greatest and most influential philosophical books of all time. It includes incisive commentary on every major theme and argument in the Meditations, and will be valuable not only to philosophers but to historians, theologians, literary scholars, and interested general readers.

Humans can learn complex functional relationships between variables from small amounts of data. In doing so, they draw on prior expectations about the form of these relationships. In three experiments, we show that people learn to adjust these expectations through experience, learning about the likely forms of the functions they will encounter. Previous work has used Gaussian processes—a statistical framework that extends Bayesian nonparametric approaches to regression—to model human function learning. We build on this work, modeling the process of learning (...) to learn functions as a form of hierarchical Bayesian inference about the Gaussian process hyperparameters. (shrink)

This paper criticises a line of argument adopted by peter winch, Karl popper, And others, To the effect that the course of human history cannot be predicted. On this view it is impossible to predict in a particularly detailed way certain events ('original acts') on which important social developments depend. We analyze the argument, Showing that one version fails: original acts are in principle predictable in the relevant way. A cogent version is presented; this requires a special definition for 'original (...) act'. But, We claim, Social developments do not depend on original acts so defined. We argue separately for the possibility of a person, Or a scientific community, Predicting his or its own original acts. (shrink)

Kants Vernunftkritik hat das Wissen zugunsten des Glaubens aufgehoben. Angeregt vor allem durch F.H. Jacobi, wird das Verhältnis von Glauben und Vernunft in der Philosophie nach Kant erneut zu einem zentralen Thema. Zur Entscheidung stehen die Fragen, ob der Glaube das Fundament von Wissen sein kann, ob der Glaube eine Grenze der Vernunft markiert oder ob eine absolut ges.

This book provides practical and research-based chapters that offer greater clarity about the particular kinds of teacher reflection that matter and avoids talking about teacher reflection generically, which implies that all kinds of reflection are of equal value.

This paper joins the voices warning against hasty transference of legal concepts of presumption to other kinds of argumentation, especially to deliberation about future acts and policies. Comparison of the pragmatics which respectively constitute the illocutionary acts of accusing and proposing reveals important differences in the ways presumptions prompt accusers and proposers to undertake probative responsibilities and, also, points to corresponding differences in their probative duties. This comparison has theoretically important implication regarding the norms governing persuasive argumentation. The paper is (...) based on a broadly Gricean account of speech acts. (shrink)

The debate between externalists and internalists in epistemology can be viewed as a disagreement about whether there are epistemic rights without corresponding duties or obligations. Taking an epistemic right to believe P as an authorization to not only accept P as true but to use P as a positive reason for accepting other propositions, the debate is about whether there are unjustified justifiers. It is about whether there are propositions that provide for others what nothing need provide for them—viz., reasons (...) for thinking them true. (shrink)

Policy Review, the organ of the conservative Heritage Foundation, devoted their winter 1984 issue to lamenting the failures of the Reagan administration. Publisher M. Stan ton Evans complained that “This has been essentially another Ford Administration, … not much different from any other Republican administration in our lifetime. While the other Senator from Colorado, arch-conservative William Armstrong noted that Reagan had ‘managed to polarize the country over budget cuts that didn't happen.” “He cut the budget,” bemoaned Armstrong, “enough to make (...) the special interests and the press mad, but not enough” to restructure the government. For his part, National Conservative Political Action Committee (NCPAC) chair Terry Donlan has complained of the administration failure to move on its social agenda. (shrink)

Externalism about knowledge commits one to a modest form of contextualism: whether one knows depends (or may depend) on circumstances (context) of which one has no knowledge. Such modest contextualism requires the rejection of the KK Principle (If S knows that P, then S knows that S knows that P) - something most people would want to reject anyway - but it does not require (though it is compatible with) a rejection of closure. Radical contextualism, on the other hand, goes (...) a step farther and relativizes knowledge not just to the circumstances of the knower, but to the circumstances of the person attributing knowledge. I reject this more radical form of contextualism and suggest that it confuses (or that it can, at least, be avoided by carefully distinguishing) the relativity in what S is said to know from the relativity in whether S knows what S is said to know. (shrink)

Closure is the epistemological thesis that if S knows that P and knows that P implies Q, then if S infers that Q, S knows that Q. Fred Dretske acknowledges that closure is plausible but contends that it should be rejected because it conflicts with the plausible thesis: Conclusive reasons (CR): S knows that P only if S believes P on the basis of conclusive reasons, i.e., reasons S wouldn‘t have if it weren‘t the case that P. Dretske develops (...) an analysis of knowing that centers on CR, and argues that the requirement undermines skepticism by implying the falsity of closure. We develop a Dretske-style analysis of knowing that incorporates CR, and we argue that this analysis not only accords with closure, but also implies it. In addition, we argue that the analysis accounts for the prima facie plausibility of closure-invoking skeptical arguments, and nonetheless implies that they are fallacious. If our arguments turn out to be sound, the acceptability of Dretske‘s analysis of knowing will be significantly enhanced by the fact that, despite implying closure, it undermines closure-based skepticism. (shrink)

Cairns, D. My own life.--Chapman, H. The phenomenon of language.--Embree, L. E. An interpretation of the doctrine of the ego in Husserl's Ideen.--Farber, M. The philosophic impact of the facts themselves.--Gurwitsch, A. Perceptual coherence as the foundation of the judgment of prediction.--Hartshorne, C. Husserl and Whitehead on the concrete.--Jordan, R. W. Being and time: some aspects of the ego's involvement in his mental life.--Kersten, F. Husserl's doctrine of noesis-noema.--McGill, V. J. Evidence in Husserl's phenomenology.--Natanson, M. Crossing the Manhattan Bridge.--Spiegelberg, H. (...) Husserl's way into phenomenology for Americans: a letter and its sequel.--Zaner, R. M. The art of free phantasy in rigorous phenomenological science.--Cairns, D. An approach to Husserlian phenomenology.--Cairns, D. The ideality of verbal expressions.--Cairns, D. Perceiving, remembering, image-awareness, feigning awareness.--Bibliography of the writings of Dorion Cairns (p. [263]-264). (shrink)

Introduction: reenvisaging freedom and solidarity -- Twilights and new dawns: revaluation and de(con)struction -- Letting-be politically: Heidegger on freedom and solidarity -- The promise of democracy: nonpossessive freedom and caring solidarity -- Markets and democracy: beyond neoliberalism -- Rights and right(ness): humanity at the crossroads -- "Man against the state": community and dissent -- Faith and communicative freedom: a tribute to Wolfgang Huber -- Between holism and totalitarianism: remembering Dimitry Likhachev -- Freedom as engaged social praxis: lessons from D.P. Chattopadhyaya (...) -- Freedom and solidarity (again): reimagining social democracy. (shrink)

Though one believes that P is true, one can have reasons for thinking it false. Yet, it seems that one cannot know that P is true and (still) have reasons for thinking it false. Why is this so? What feature of knowledge (or of reasons) precludes having reasons or evidence to believe (true) what you know to be false? If the connection between reasons (evidence) and what one believes is expressible as a probability relation, it would seem that the only (...) satisfactory explanation of this fact is that when one knows that P is true, the reasons or evidence one has in support of P are such as to confer upon P the probability of 1. It is shown by an application of Bayes' Theorem that any value smaller than 1 would permit having reasons to believe what one knows to be false. Hence, it would seem that knowledge requires conclusive reasons to believe (if reasons or evidence is required at all). (shrink)

Melnyk complains that my account of the way reasons explain behaviour cannot be extended to cover novel behaviours. I admit that I did not extend it, but deny that it is not extendible. This, indeed, is what Chapter 6 of Dretske (1988) was all about. Noordhof finds faults with my account and claims there is another account (partial supervenience) that does a better job. I acknowledge one of the defects—a defect I was aware of when I wrote the book‐but deny (...) that the partial supervenience of content on intrinsic properties represents a better theory of the explanatory role of content. (shrink)

I would like to record my thanks to Paul Thompson for useful conver sations over the years, and also to several generations of students who have helped me develop my ideas on biological theory and on Darwin. My wife has, as usual, been more than helpful; in particular she typed a good portion of the manuscript while I was on leave a few years ago, more now than I like to remember. My parents were both looking forward to holding a (...) final copy of this book. I only regret that my mother did not live long enough to see its completion. I must also thank the publishers and their staff. They have been re markably patient about meeting deadlines - promises were repeatedly made and then, owing to family situations, had to be broken - and for this I am considerably in their debt. I would further like to thank the following authors and publishers for permission to use their work: R. C. Lewontin, The Genetic Basis of Evolutionary Change, Figure 1, p. 14; © 1964 Columbia University Press; reprinted here by kind permission of the author and publisher. F. Wilson, 'Goudge's Contribution to the Philosophy of Science', in L. W. Sumner, J. G. Slater, and F. Wilson (eds.), Pragmatism and Purpose: Essays in Honour of T. A. Goudge; © 1964 University of Toronto Press; reproduced here in part by kind permission of all the editors and the publisher. (shrink)

Ferrer, Vicent (2021)De suppositionibusEdició crítica del text llatí, traducció catalana, introducció a cura de Josep Batalla i Elena de la Cruz Vergari, traducció anglesa de Robert D. HughesSanta Coloma de Queralt: Obrador Edèndum, 793 p.ISBN 978-84-120007-4-0.

Gomes de Lisboa Escrito sobre as Questões Metafísicas de António André: Scriptum super Questiones Metaphisice Antonii AndreeEdição bilingue latim-português. Introdução, edição, tradução e notas Mário João CorreiaPorto: Edições Afrontamento, 195 p.ISBN 978-972-36-1839-6.

Este artigo tem com pano de fundo a controvérsia entre criacionismo e evolucionismo que ainda captura a imaginação de amplos segmentos religiosamente orientados, sobretudo nos Estados Unidos. Aqui destacamos as proposições elaboradas pela chamada Teoria do Design Inteligente (TDI). Essa teoria, que se apresenta como científica e desprovida de qualquer compromisso religioso, propõe demonstrar empiricamente que a complexidade observada na natureza, no universo e na vida, é resultante de um design genuíno, ou seja, produto de uma inteligência organizadora, e não (...) produto de processos puramente materiais e aleatórios, isto é, decorrentes do acaso, ou da seleção natural, tal como sugere o darwinismo. Neste artigo trataremos da emergência da Teoria do Design Inteligente e de seus principais argumentos, tal como elaborados por seus proponentes, estudados pelos seus analistas e confrontados pelos seus críticos, a fim de verificar se ela é considerada teoria científica ou uma variante mais sofisticada e atual do criacionismo cristão. Palavras-chave: Religião; Ciência; Criacionismo; Design Inteligente.This article has as a backdrop the controversy between creationism and evolutionism that still captures the imagination of large religious segments, especially in the USA. This text highlights the propositions drawn up by the so called Intelligent Design Theory. Such theory, which is presented as scientific and devoid of any religious commitment aims to demonstrate empirically that the complexity observed in nature, in the universe and in the life, is a the result of a genuine design. In this sense, it would be a product of an organizing intelligence and not a product of purely material and random processes resulting from chance, or from natural selection, as suggested by Darwinism. In this article, we will deal with the emergence of Intelligent Design and its main arguments, such as elaborated by its proponents, studied by its analysts and confronted by critics, to verify if it is considered a scientific theory or a more sophisticated variant of Christian creationism. Key-words: Religion; Science; Creationism; Intelligent Design. (shrink)

A diverse group of contributors reflect on the philosophical legacy of Fred Sommers and his efforts to revive and refashion traditional Aristotelian logic for a post-Fregean world.

A riqueza do debate ocorrido entre os filósofos Luc Ferry e Marcel Gauchet, em janeiro de 1999, deu origem a este artigo, em que os autores exploram os temas e as questões discutidas naquela ocasião. O artigo apresenta as diferentes posições dos dois pensadores franceses, cuja preocupação maior é pensar as condições de possibilidade da religião e do religioso nos tempos atuais. Tempos em que, segundo os debatedores, predomina a individualização da crença e nos quais a presença de uma religiosidade (...) sempre mais inquieta, difusa e incerta convive com o enfraquecimento institucional das religiões. Longe de desaparecer num universo cada vez mais laicizado, o religioso, como indagação sobre o sentido último da vida ou como aspiração ao absoluto, tende a permanecer como um substrato insuperável. Como, então, pensar o religioso após a religião? O texto apresenta as diferentes e divergentes posições de Ferry e Gauchet acerca da pertinência do uso de termos clássicos como "sagrado", "divino", "transcendente", dentre outros, para tratar os constituintes dessa religiosidade contemporânea e inquieta, própria de uma época na qual se torna impossível a edificação de um mundo de parte a parte estruturado pela religião e na qual o religioso impregnaria todos os setores da vida pública e privada. Palavras-chave: Religião; Religiosidade; Secularização; Autonomia; Heteronomia.This paper analyses the questions and problems that was discussed during an important debate between the French philosophers Marcel Gauchet and Luc Ferry, which take place at Paris on January, 1999. The paper discusses the different conceptions of these thinkers about the status of religion and the religious in nowadays. Days that witnesses the individualization of religious belief and the presence of a restless, uncertain and spread religiosity which however, lives side by side with an institutional weakening of the historical religions. Far from disappearing in a more and more laicized world, the religious as an inquiring about searching on ultimate sense for our lives seems to remain as a permanent individual issue. Nevertheless, how is it possible to conceive the religious after the deregulation of historical religions? Classical terms like "sacred", "divine", "transcendent" and "absolute" are sufficient to qualify and analyze the elements of this restless and uncertain religiosity, which seems to be constitutive of societies that do not need religious legitimacy anymore. Keywords: Religion; religious; secularization; autonomy; heteronomy. (shrink)